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 Human Dignity and Human Rights as a 
Common Ground for a Global Bioethics 
 ROBERTO  ANDORNO  
 University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland 
 The principle of respect for human dignity plays a crucial role in 
the emerging global norms relating to bioethics, in particular in 
the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human 
Rights. This instrument, which is a legal, not merely an ethical 
document, can be regarded as an extension of international hu-
man rights law into the fi eld of biomedicine. Although the Declara-
tion does not explicitly defi ne human dignity, it would be a mistake 
to see the emphasis put on this notion as a mere rhetorical strategy. 
Rather, the appeal to dignity refl ects a real concern about the need 
to promote respect both for the intrinsic worth of human beings 
and for the integrity of the human species. But dignity alone can-
not solve most of the dilemmas posed by biomedical practice. This 
is why international biolaw combines, on the one hand, the appeal 
to human dignity as an overarching principle with, on the other 
hand, the recourse to human rights, which provide an effective 
and practical way forward for dealing with bioethical issues at a 
global level. 
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 I .  INTRODUCTION 
 Recent intergovernmental instruments specifi cally dealing with biomedicine, 
particularly those adopted since the end of the 1990s by the United Nations 
Educational, Scientifi c, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Council of 
Europe, assign a very central role to the notion of human dignity, which is 
presented as the ultimate rationale behind the new rules relating to this matter. 
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At the same time, they appeal to a human rights framework as a way to rein-
force their provisions and to articulate specifi c rules to govern this fi eld. The 
aim of this paper is to examine the recourse to human dignity and human rights 
in the fi eld of global bioethics, with particular reference to the 2005 UNESCO 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. To this end, after some 
preliminary remarks about the relationship between bioethics and law, this 
paper will fi rst briefl y examine the meaning and value of the notion of human 
dignity in the international norms relating to bioethics; second, it will argue that 
human dignity and human rights are the best, if not the only available grounds 
for the development of international legal standards for biomedicine. 
 II .  BIOETHICS AND LAW: WHAT RELATIONSHIP? 
 The Term  “ Bioethics ” May Also Be Understood As Including the Legal 
Aspects of Biomedical Issues 
 Before focusing on the role played by human dignity and human rights in 
global bioethics, two preliminary remarks ought to be made. The fi rst relates 
to the meaning of the word  “ bioethics, ” which is terribly ambiguous and may 
lead to serious misunderstandings. Depending on the context, it can be used 
with a narrow meaning or with a broad meaning. The narrow meaning refers 
to the purely  ethical dimension of life sciences. From this perspective, 
bioethics is just  a part of ethics . When the term  “ bioethics ” is so understood, 
it is a contradiction in terms to speak of  “ laws on bioethics ” because what is 
ethical or unethical is not, and indeed cannot, be prescribed by law. Though 
ethics and law interact in various ways and may signifi cantly overlap with 
one another, they remain as two different normative systems, for the simple 
reason that they pursue different goals: ethics refl ects the effort of our reason 
in discovering whether something is right or wrong and aims at promoting 
the fulfi llment of our tendencies toward the good, at least according to the 
classical, or Aristotelian, view on ethics. In contrast, law has a much nar-
rower scope than ethics, because it does not seek to make men moral, even 
if legal norms certainly have an indirect positive impact on the moral fulfi ll-
ment of persons. The basic purpose of law is just to ensure that human re-
lationships are governed by the principle of justice, or in other words, that 
the rights of each individual, as well as the common interests of society as a 
whole, are guaranteed. Whereas the fundamental question of ethics is  “ What 
should I do to become a better person?, ” the key question of law is  “ What 
rules do we need to promote a peaceful and fair society? ” 
 In an attempt to illustrate the intricate relationship between ethics and law, 
the German legal philosopher  Jellinek (1908, 45) characterized law as  “ the 
minimum ethics ” ( das ethische Minimum ). By this expression, he meant that 
law only embodies those moral requirements that have to do with  “ the indis-
pensable conditions of social life. ” An understanding of the different objectives 
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that ethics and law try to achieve is key to grasp why ethics inevitably 
covers and will always cover a much broader spectrum than law; it also 
shows why what is unethical is not (and should not be) necessarily illegal. 
Only a totalitarian regime could attempt, with any chance of success, to make 
them overlapping. The distinction between these realms is extremely impor-
tant, and in a fi eld like bioethics, in which one may have the impression that 
they fuse, it should be carefully maintained. In this regard, it is noteworthy 
that, precisely in order to prevent any confusion between ethics and law, the 
Council of Europe has preferred to avoid the use of the word  “ bioethics ” in 
the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine adopted in 1997. This is 
the reason why even the title of this instrument, which included the term 
 “ bioethics ” in its draft version, was changed from  “ Convention on Human 
Rights and Bioethics ” to  “ Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. ” 
 But this risk of confusion can be eliminated by explaining that the term 
 “ bioethics ” can also be used with a broad meaning, which in addition to 
biomedical  ethics , also includes the  legal aspects of biomedical issues (some-
times called  “ biomedical law ” or simply  “ biolaw ” ). In this respect,  “ regula-
tory and policy bioethics ” has been sometimes mentioned as one of the four 
main varieties of  “ bioethics ” ( Callahan, 2004, 281 ). The possibility of such a 
broad understanding of the term  “ bioethics, ” which may include rules and 
issues of a legal nature, explains why this word can be used without any 
embarrassment by the UNESCO declarations, which far from attempting to 
 “ subsume medical ethics ” ( Faunce, 2005, 177 ), are indeed conceived as an 
 extension of international human rights law into the fi eld of biomedicine. 
 Soft Law Is Law, Not Ethics 
 The second preliminary remark is closely connected with the fi rst one and 
relates to the  status of the UNESCO declarations. There is a widely diffused 
idea that these documents are purely ethical or rhetorical recommendations 
deprived of any legal effect. This view probably stems from the fact that, 
unlike treaties, the UNESCO declarations, as any  “ soft law ” agreements, are 
usually characterized as  “ nonbinding instruments. ” Although this depiction is 
not entirely wrong, it may be misleading because while soft law does not 
have a binding effect per se, it is  conceived to have such effect in the long 
term . This means that although treaties are  actually binding (after ratifi cation 
by states), soft law instruments are only  potentially binding. Soft law is in-
deed envisaged as the  beginning of a gradual process in which further steps 
are needed to make of such agreements binding rules for states. 
 It is noteworthy that the use of  soft law has rapidly developed in recent 
decades as a new source of international law for dealing with particularly 
sensitive matters such as human rights, the protection of the environment, 
and bioethical issues. Soft law presents the great advantage of allowing 
countries to gradually become familiar with the commonly agreed standards 
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before they are confronted with the adoption of enforceable rules at the 
national or international level. This gradual procedure leaves more room for 
discussion and achieving consensus on issues that are especially complex or 
sensitive, or more exposed to change, like those related to scientifi c develop-
ments ( Lenoir and Mathieu, 1998 , 45). 
 The most notable example of the signifi cant role that soft law can play in 
the development of binding norms is provided by the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948. This document, which took the form of a 
soft law instrument, is today widely recognized as the cornerstone of the 
entire international human rights system that emerged in the aftermath of the 
Second World War. The UDHR did not only pave the way for the adoption 
of more than seventy treaties, which are applied today on a permanent basis 
at global and regional levels, but also served as a model for many constitu-
tions and laws throughout the world and helped to ground uncountable 
decisions of national and international courts ( Cançado Trinidade, 2008, 2 ). 
 Regarding the UNESCO declarations, it is important to note that if the 
binding effect were totally absent from them, they would not be  “ law ” at all 
because one of the classical distinctions between  “ ethics ” and  “ law ” is pre-
cisely that law is made up of  enforceable norms whereas ethics is  not en-
forceable . Thus, it is somehow misleading to affi rm that soft law only creates 
 moral or political commitment for states. This is only true if we consider the 
 immediate effect of soft law instruments. But the fact is that, in a more indi-
rect and persuasive way, they have an infl uence on states which is not very 
different from that of treaties. Indeed, some studies show that, surprisingly, 
declarations and treaties are complied with to largely the same extent 
( Hillgenberg, 1999, 502 ). We should not forget that, after all, soft law instru-
ments are  formal intergovernmental agreements , and in this respect, they do 
not differ essentially from the traditional international binding instruments. 
 Furthermore, there is no doubt that the UNESCO declarations have been 
adopted with the  intention that in the long run, in one way or another, they 
will become binding rules for states. This  “ hardening ” of soft law may happen 
in two different ways. One is when declarations are the fi rst step toward a 
 treaty-making process , in which reference will be made to the principles al-
ready stated in the declarations. Another possibility is that nontreaty agree-
ments are intended to have a direct infl uence on the practice of states, and to 
the extent that they are successful in doing so, they may lead to the creation 
of  customary law . As some experts explain, declarations may  “ catalyse the 
creation of customary law by expressing in normative terms certain principles 
whose general acceptance is already in the air  … and thereby making it easier 
and more likely for states to conform their conduct to them ” ( Szasz, 1992, 60 ). 
Thus, if the same nonbinding standards are reaffi rmed in successive interna-
tional treaties, or invoked by international courts to support their decisions, in 
the course of time they may become binding rules in the form of customary 
law, as it happened with the UDHR of 1948 ( Dimitrijevic, 2006, 8 – 10 ). 
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 III .  HUMAN DIGNITY: THE OVERARCHING PRINCIPLE OF GLOBAL 
BIOETHICS 
 The principle of respect for human dignity holds a prominent position in the 
intergovernmental instruments dealing with bioethics that have been ad-
opted during the last decade. The emphasis on human dignity is impressive 
enough to lead scholars to characterize this notion as  “ the shaping principle ” 
of international bioethics ( Lenoir and Mathieu, 1998 , 16). Far from represent-
ing a shift merely in style, the higher profi le accorded to this notion in bio-
ethics is seen as a true shift in substance that needs to be carefully considered 
( Beyleveld and Brownsword, 2002 , 29). Thus, it is not surprising that the 
2005 Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, which formu-
lates a set of norms to guide biomedical practice, assigns the fi rst place to 
the principle of respect for  “ human dignity, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms ” (Article 3.1). 
 Certainly, the recourse to human dignity is neither new in international 
law nor specifi c to policy documents relating to bioethics. The above-
mentioned UDHR of 1948 states in its Preamble that  “ the inherent dignity ” of 
all members of the human family is  “ the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world. ” Thereafter, the idea of human dignity has been at the 
heart of the major human rights instruments, beginning with the two inter-
national covenants on human rights adopted in 1966: the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), as well as in most treaties 
banning torture, slavery, inhuman and degrading treatments, and discrimina-
tions of all sorts. 
 Nevertheless, although the notion of human dignity has always held an 
important position in international law, the key role it plays in the emerging 
international biomedical law is really impressive. It is therefore not exagger-
ated to characterize it as the  “ overarching principle ” of international biolaw. 
Regarding the 2005 UNESCO Declaration, respect for human dignity not only is 
placed fi rst in the list of principles that should govern the biomedical fi eld 
(Article 3) but also embodies the central aim of the whole instrument (Article 2.c). 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the need to include the principle of 
respect for human dignity was one of the points most often mentioned by 
member states during the worldwide consultations that took place between 
January and March 2004 ( UNESCO, 2004, 2 ). 
 What are the reasons for this emphasis on human dignity in global 
bioethics? The fi rst obvious reason is that biomedical practice is closely related 
to the most basic human rights, namely the rights to life, to physical integrity, 
to privacy, to access to basic health care, among others. If human dignity is 
generally recognized as the foundation on which human rights are based, 
then it is not surprising that it is invoked as the ultimate rationale of the legal 
norms governing biomedical practice. But there is another reason explaining 
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this phenomenon. The notion of human dignity is beginning to be seen as 
the last barrier against the alteration of some basic features of the human 
species that might result from practices such as reproductive cloning or 
germ-line interventions. It should be noted that resorting to human rights is 
insuffi cient to cope with these new challenges because human rights only 
belong to existing individuals, not to humanity as such. In fact, an act like 
reproductive cloning, which is done prior to the existence of an individual 
cannot, by defi nition, infringe the rights and dignity of that individual. This 
is so because the so-called  “ future persons, ” who are contingent in the sense 
that they may or not come into existence, are not persons at all, neither from 
a legal nor from a philosophical perspective. Thus, reproductive cloning, as 
well as germ-line interventions may be seen as a threat, not to individuals, 
but to the integrity of the human species as such ( Annas, Andrews, and Isasi, 
2002 , 151 – 78). This is the reason why the 1997 Universal Declaration on the 
Human Genome and Human Rights directly appeals to the notion of human 
dignity, not to human rights, to reject both practices (Articles 11 and 24). 
 Even though the notion of dignity is not defi ned by the UNESCO instru-
ments, the 2005 Declaration provides a signifi cant contribution to the under-
standing of this concept. Article 3.2 stipulates that  “ the interests and welfare 
of the individual should have priority over the sole interest of science or 
society. ” This basic principle had been outlined for the fi rst time in 1964 in 
the famous Declaration of Helsinki for medical research on human subjects 
developed by the World Medical Association. Thereafter, it was incorporated 
into the 1997 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human 
Rights (Article 10) and into the 1997 European Convention of Human Rights 
and Biomedicine (Article 2). The primacy of the human being over science 
is indeed a direct corollary of the principle of respect for human dignity and 
aims to emphasize two fundamental ideas. First, that science is not an end 
in itself but only a means for improving the welfare of individuals and soci-
ety. Second, that people should not be reduced to mere instruments for the 
benefi t of science. Certainly, the fact of living in society renders it indispens-
able that citizens should in some way contribute to the common good, ac-
cording to their capacities and preferences. However, in democratic societies, 
people do not live for the sake of society or science, but have their own 
purpose, which greatly transcends the boundaries of social or scientifi c in-
terests. This is precisely the key message that Article 3.2 of the UNESCO 
Declaration wants to deliver. 
 IV .  CAN  ‘ HUMAN DIGNITY ’ BE DEFINED BY LAW? 
 Although the notion of human dignity is at the heart of the major interna-
tional human rights instruments, it is never explicitly defi ned by them. They 
provide however a valuable guidance for the understanding of this concept 
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when they state: fi rst, that dignity is  “ inherent  … to all members of the 
human family ” (UDHR, Preamble); second, that all human beings are  “ free 
and equal in dignity and rights ” (UDHR, Article 1); and third, that  “ these 
rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person ” (ICCPR and 
ICESCR, Preambles). 
 These three ideas, even though they may appear to be extremely vague, 
offer a precious guidance for clarifying the meaning with which the notion 
of human dignity is used by international law:
 a. The term  “ inherent ” means  “ involved in the constitution or essential character of 
something, ”  “ intrinsic, ”  “ permanent or characteristic attribute of something. ” The 
idea expressed in this term, when it is accompanied by the adjective  “ human, ” is that 
dignity is  inseparable from the human condition. Thus, dignity is not an accidental 
quality of some human beings, or a value derived from some specifi c personal fea-
tures such as the fact of being young or old, man or woman, healthy or sick, but 
rather an unconditional worth that everyone has simply by virtue of being human. 
The same idea can be expressed by saying that all human beings are  “ persons. ” 
Indeed, the term  “ person ” is not merely descriptive or generic (like for instance 
 “ mammal ” ), but prescriptive, a  nomen dignitatis ( Spaemann, 1996, 13 ). 
 b. The second important consequence of the meaning that  “ human dignity ” bears in 
international law is that basic rights are  equal for all: if human dignity is the same 
for all and the ground of human rights, then all human beings possess equal basic 
rights. This is the reason why discrimination, i.e. the unjust distinction in the treat-
ment of different categories of people, is directly contrary to human dignity. 
 c. The third statement of international law stressing that rights  derive from human 
dignity, has also an important practical consequence: if basic rights are not given by 
authority, but are pre-existing values which are inherent in every human being, then 
they cannot be legitimately taken away ( Schachter, 1983, 853 ). 
 Considering these three basic features of human dignity, it is not surprising 
that this notion is at the center of human rights instruments prohibiting prac-
tices such as torture, inhuman or degrading treatments, slavery, exploitative 
working conditions, discrimination, arbitrary arrests, etc. But even in these 
cases, the term is not explicitly defi ned by international law. Rather, its 
meaning is  “ left to intuitive understanding, conditioned in large measure by 
cultural factors ” ( Schachter, 1983, 849 ). The UNESCO Universal Declaration 
on Bioethics and Human Rights is not an exception in this regard, as it does 
not attempt to provide any defi nition of this concept. 
 It would be however a mistake to conclude from this lack of defi nition 
that dignity is a simple slogan that means no more than  “ respect for auton-
omy ” and therefore could simply be eliminated without any loss of content 
( Macklin, 2003, 1419 ). 
 Certainly, the concept of human dignity is open to abuse and misinterpre-
tation. But the same happens with all basic moral and legal principles 
(justice, freedom, autonomy, etc.), which are normally not defi ned by law, 
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not only because of the impossibility of fi nding a precise defi nition of such 
fundamental concepts that satisfi es everyone, especially in a transcultural 
context, but also because lawmakers are well aware that rigid defi nitions 
may in some cases lead to unsolvable diffi culties in the implementation of 
legal norms. In this regard, they prefer to follow the old Roman dictum:  omnis 
defi nitio in iure periculosa est ( “ every defi nition in law is perilous ” ). 
 It is also true that bioethical debates often show an infl ationary use of the 
term  “ dignity ” that should be avoided, especially when no additional expla-
nation is given to make it clear why a particular practice is regarded as being 
in conformity (or not) with this basic principle. In such cases, dignity ap-
pears to be used as  “ mere rhetorical dressing, adding little more to the policy 
debate than the weight or cachet of the concept ” ( Caulfi eld and Chapman, 
2005 , 737). 
 However, beyond all the abusive rhetoric that may surround this notion, a 
careful analysis of intergovernmental policy documents relating to bioethics, 
and of the discussion that led to their adoption, puts in evidence that the re-
course to human dignity refl ects a real concern about the need to ensure re-
spect for the inherent worth of every human being. This concern is far broader 
than simply ensuring  “ respect for autonomy ” for the simple reason that it also 
includes the protection of those who are not yet, or are no more, morally 
autonomous (newborn infants, senile elderly, people with serious mental 
disorders, comatose patients, etc.). As noted above, this broad view of the 
concept of human dignity is clearly enshrined in international human rights 
law, which assumes that the worth of human beings does not rest on their 
actual intellectual or moral abilities, but merely on their  human condition. 
 V .  IS DIGNITY A SYNONYM FOR  “ RESPECT ” ? 
 There is no doubt that the concept of  “ dignity ” is very close to that of  “ re-
spect. ” However, it would be a mistake to identify both concepts or to think 
that we can avoid the diffi culties posed by the abstract notion of dignity just 
by replacing it with the more practical idea of respect. This would be a false 
solution because respect for persons is just the  consequence of human dig-
nity, not dignity itself, in a similar way that the bell’s sound is an effect pro-
duced by the bell, not the bell itself. Moreover, this explanation would 
inevitably beg the question and lead to circular reasoning:  “ we are obliged 
to respect persons because  … they deserve respect. ” In fact, the idea of dig-
nity is not a synonym for respect for the simple reason that dignity is what 
provides the rationale to the requirement of respect for persons. 
 In modern times, Kant was probably the fi rst major philosopher to put the 
notions of respect ( Achtung ) and dignity ( Würde ) at the very center of moral 
theory. Even though one may disagree with his excessively formalistic view of 
ethics, one has to acknowledge that his famous second formulation of the cat-
egorical imperative is very helpful for understanding the practical consequences 
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of the notion of dignity. According to this principle, we should always treat 
people as an end in themselves ( Zweck an sich selbst ) and never merely as a 
means to our ends. The reason is that human beings are not  “ things, ” but  “ per-
sons ” and hence not something that can be used merely as a means. Although 
things have a price, that is, the kind of value for which there can be equivalent, 
dignity makes a person irreplaceable ( Kant, 1996, 79 ). 
 The Kantian requirement of noninstrumentalization (or noncommodifi ca-
tion) of persons is extremely illuminating in bioethics. It means, for instance, 
that no one should be subjected to biomedical research without his or her 
informed consent, even when very valuable knowledge could result from 
that research; it also means that law must prevent poor people from being 
induced to sell their organs as a means to support themselves or their fami-
lies ( Cohen, 2002, 59 ). These two examples illustrate that the idea of dignity 
as a requirement of noninstrumentalization of persons, far from being purely 
rhetorical, has some immediate applications. But beyond such extreme ex-
amples, the view that people have inherent worth plays a major role in ev-
eryday medical practice and can greatly contribute to enhance the quality of 
the doctor-patient relationship. More concretely, this vision helps to keep 
alive in the minds of health care professionals the conviction that each pa-
tient, no matter what his or her diagnosis, is not a  “ case, ” a  “ disease, ” or a 
 “ room number, ” but a  person that deserves to be treated with the greatest 
respect and care. 
 VI .  THE VARIOUS FUNCTIONS OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN BIOETHICS 
 To understand how the notion of human dignity operates in bioethics, it is 
essential to make some conceptual distinctions, particularly between the 
above-described  inherent dignity of the human person and the  moral dig-
nity , which is a synonym of  “ honor. ” Whereas the former plays a central role 
in legal instruments relating to bioethics, the latter has much less relevance 
in this fi eld. Thus, it must be assumed that this notion is used in the fi rst 
sense, unless it is clearly indicated otherwise. 
 On the one hand, the inherent dignity, as it is inseparable from the human 
condition, is the same for all, cannot be gained or lost and does not allow for 
any degree ( Spiegelberg, 1970, 55 ). Even the worst criminal cannot be stripped 
of his or her human dignity and should consequently not be subjected to 
inhuman treatments or punishments.  Dworkin (1994, 236) employs the ex-
pression human dignity with this meaning when he points out that it refers 
to  “ the intrinsic importance of human life ” and requires that  “ people  never be 
treated in a way that denies the distinct importance of their own lives. ” 
 On the other hand, moral dignity does not relate to the  existence itself of 
persons, but to their  behavior and stems from their ability to freely choose 
good and to contribute benefi cially to their own lives and the lives of others. 
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It can be said that we give to ourselves this second kind of dignity by making 
good moral choices. This is why, unlike inherent dignity, which is the same 
for all, moral dignity is not possessed by all individuals to the same degree. 
Indeed, we can say, for instance, that an honest man has  “ more dignity ” than 
a thief. 
 Alan Gewirth makes this same distinction when he writes that:
 [t]he sense of  ‘ dignity ’ in which all humans are said to have equal dignity is not the 
same as that in which it may be said of some person that he lacks dignity or that he 
behaves without dignity  … This kind of dignity is one that humans may occasionally 
exhibit, lack, or lose, whereas the dignity in which all humans are said to be equal 
is a characteristic that belongs permanently and inherently to every human as such 
( 1982 , 27 – 8). 
 Another distinction that has been suggested as being relevant to bioethics is 
between  “ human dignity as empowerment ” and  “ human dignity as constraint ” 
( Beyleveld and Brownsword, 2002 , 1 – 47). Whereas the former emphasizes 
freedom to pursue one’s autonomously chosen goals, the latter is more con-
cerned with  duties than with human rights and acts as a constraint on freedom 
in the interest of the common good. Beyleveld and Brownsword characterize 
both notions as  “ opposed ” or  “ competing ” and argue that although the found-
ing international instruments of human rights appeal to the fi rst conception of 
human dignity, dignity as constraint would be typical of the recent instru-
ments dealing with biomedicine and much more controversial. 
 Nevertheless, this distinction, at least as it is presented, is somehow mis-
leading. These two facets of human dignity do not really constitute rival no-
tions. They are not mutually exclusive but complementary, in the same way 
that  “ rights ” and  “ duties ” or  “ freedom ” and  “ responsibility ” are complemen-
tary concepts. Indeed, the same principle stating that human beings have 
intrinsic worth results in two consequences. First, that each individual is en-
titled to fundamental rights and freedoms. Second, that people deserve to be 
protected from serious threats to their dignity, even if they might appear to 
be consenting to such acts. The reason for the complementary nature of 
these two facets of human dignity is that most rights are not absolute but 
subject to such reasonable limits as are generally accepted in a free and 
democratic society, as it is explicitly recognized by all major international 
human rights instruments. In this regard, for instance, Article 12.3 of the ICCPR 
stipulates that:
 [t]he above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those 
which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order 
( ordre public ), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are 
consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant. 
 As a matter of fact, the notion that individual freedoms can be restricted to 
ensure respect for human dignity is neither new nor specifi c to the instru-
ments dealing with biomedicine. Rather on the contrary, such restrictions are 
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quite common in legal documents, both at the domestic and international 
level. Just to give two examples: labor laws do not allow workers to waive 
their basic rights and benefi ts or to accept working conditions close to slav-
ery; contract laws do not recognize the validity of contracts containing terms 
that are unfairly burdensome to one party and unfairly benefi cial to the 
other. Thus, from this perspective, there is nothing new in the recent instru-
ments relating to biomedicine, except that they cover novel issues. This is 
why, rather than presenting  “ dignity as constraint ” as a new concept and op-
posed to  “ dignity as empowerment, ” it would be perhaps more accurate to 
describe both perspectives as being two facets of the same need to ensure 
respect for people. In this line of thinking, some scholars suggest distin-
guishing between the  “ subjective ” and the  “ objective ” dimensions of dignity, 
which are complementary and correspond to freedom and to restrictions of 
freedom respectively ( Manaï, 2006, 20 – 4 ). 
 Another distinction that needs to be made is between the  “ individual ” and 
the  “ collective ” dimensions of dignity. The former is the primary expression 
of dignity and the ground of all basic rights and freedoms, whereas the 
latter is another, more recently developed category of dignity that goes far 
beyond the mere individual sphere and refers to the value of humanity  as 
such , including future generations. This distinction has been suggested by 
 Birnbacher (1996, 114 – 15) among others. Whereas individual dignity refers 
to the idea that every human being has inherent worth, collective dignity is 
a derivative notion, which embodies the idea that the existence and integrity 
of humanity as such also has intrinsic worth and therefore also deserves to 
be protected. This extended notion of dignity lies in the background of some 
international instruments dealing with biotechnological developments that 
may affect basic features of the human species, like reproductive cloning 
and germ-line interventions. It amounts to a sort of  “ species solidarity ” 
( Manaï, 2006, 20 – 2 ) and inevitably leads to prescribe some limits on poten-
tial developments that could be harmful for the identity and integrity of 
humanity. 
 It is important to stress, however, that collective dignity is only a  derivative 
notion because dignity belongs primarily to the individual. As Teresa Iglesias 
points out while commenting on the UDHR:
 Upholding  ‘ human dignity ’ or the  ‘ dignity of the species ’ without upholding the 
dignity of each one and of all, is not to uphold dignity in its universal signifi cance. 
In the name of the  ‘ dignity of the whole ’ (of a  ‘ whole ’ group) others have come to 
suffer the atrocities to which the Declaration refers ( 2001 , 13). 
 It is also noteworthy here that an analysis of international human rights in-
struments and of the decisions of national and international courts shows 
indeed that human dignity does not play just one, but  several roles. Although 
this notion has a primary  meaning , which refers to the intrinsic value of human 
beings, it has multiple  functions , which operate at different levels. First of all, 
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dignity provides the deepest justifi cation for human rights. But it is also 
often mentioned, for instance, as the ultimate reason behind the prohibition 
of discriminatory practices, as well as an argument against torture, inhuman 
and degrading treatment and punishment, and various forms of instrumen-
talization of people (slavery, organ traffi cking, etc.). In this regard, the 
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights is a good 
example of the various roles that human dignity can play. As noted above, 
the promotion of respect for human dignity constitutes not only the main 
purpose of the document (Article 2.c) but also the fi rst principle that should 
govern biomedical issues (Article 3), the rationale for the prohibition of 
discrimination and stigmatization of individuals or groups of individuals 
(Article 11), the framework within which cultural diversity is to be respected 
(Article 12), and the interpretative principle for a correct understanding of all 
the Declaration’s provisions (Article 28). 
 VII .  THE NECESSARY RECOURSE TO HUMAN RIGHTS 
 The key role attached to human dignity in global bioethics is necessary but 
not suffi cient for providing an effective response to the complex challenges 
posed by biomedical clinical and research practice. Dignity alone cannot 
directly solve most bioethical dilemmas because it is not a magic word that 
provides immediate response to them. Some further explanations are usually 
required to indicate why some practices are considered to be in conformity 
(or not) with what is required by the intrinsic worth of human beings. Thus, 
to become  functional , dignity needs other more concrete notions that are 
normally formulated using the terminology of  “ rights ” (e.g., informed con-
sent, physical integrity, confi dentiality, nondiscrimination, etc.). Human dig-
nity and human rights are therefore mutually dependent but in different 
ways. The relationship between them is that of a principle and the concrete 
legal norms that are needed to fl esh out that principle in real life. In other 
words, although we need to recur to human dignity as the ultimate justifi ca-
tion of legal norms,  “ the practical business of pressing one’s interests against 
others ” is conducted in terms of claimed human rights ( Beyleveld and 
Brownsword, 2002 , 13). 
 The need to appeal to human rights for governing biomedicine is even 
greater at the global level. As our world becomes increasingly interconnected 
and threats to global public health continue to proliferate, it is hard to see 
how the global governance of health could be managed without assigning 
an integral role to human rights ( Gable, 2007, 534 ). It is therefore not by 
chance that the 2005 UNESCO Declaration constantly adds a reference to 
 “ human rights ” every time that it mentions human dignity. In fact, as it was 
said above, the whole declaration is conceived as an extension of interna-
tional human rights law into the fi eld of biomedicine. The importance of this 
document lies precisely in the fact that it is the fi rst intergovernmental global 
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instrument that addresses, from a broad perspective, the linkage between 
human rights and bioethics ( Andorno, 2007, 150 ). In this regard, the chair-
person of the drafting group of the Declaration does not hesitate to affi rm 
that  “ the most important achievement of the text ” consists precisely in having 
integrated the bioethical analysis into a human rights framework ( Kirby, 
2006, 126 ). As noted by the Explanatory Memorandum to the Preliminary 
Draft Declaration,  “ the drafting group also stressed the importance of taking 
international human rights legislation as the essential framework and starting 
point for the development of bioethical principles ” ( UNESCO, 2005 , Para. 11). 
This document also points out that there are two broad streams at the origin 
of the norms dealing with bioethics. The fi rst one can be traced to antiquity, 
in particular to Hippocrates, and is derived from refl ections on the practice 
of medicine. The second one, conceptualized in more recent times, has 
drawn upon the developing international human rights law. Furthermore, it 
states:  “ One of the important achievements of the declaration is that it seeks 
to unite these two streams. It clearly aims to establish the conformity of 
bioethics with international human rights law ” ( UNESCO, 2005 , Para. 12). 
 Several reasons explain the appeal to human rights to establish global 
norms in bioethics. As mentioned above, there is a very close relationship 
between biomedical activities and the most basic human rights such as the 
right to life and to physical integrity. Therefore, it is not surprising that both 
modern bioethics and international human rights were born from the same 
historical events: the Second World War, the Holocaust, and the Nuremberg 
tribunals that condemned the Nazi doctors ( Annas, 2005, 160 ). The common 
origin of both systems makes even more understandable the recourse to the 
existing human rights framework to protect individuals from harm in the 
biomedical fi eld. 
 Moreover, the human rights approach facilitates the formulation of univer-
sal standards because international human rights law is grounded on the 
assumption that basic rights transcend cultural diversity. Human rights are 
indeed conceived as entitlements that people have simply by virtue of their 
human condition and regardless of their ethnic origin, sex, age, socioeco-
nomic status, health condition, or religious or political ideas. Human rights 
are held to be universal in the sense that  “ all people have and should enjoy 
them, and to be independent in the sense that they exist and are available as 
standards of justifi cation and criticism whether or not they are recognized 
and implemented by the legal system or offi cials of a country ” ( Nickel, 1987, 
561 ). In such a sensitive fi eld as bioethics, where diverse sociocultural, phil-
osophical, and religious traditions come into play, the importance of having 
principles of universal validity should not be underemphasized. 
 A more practical reason for the use of a human rights framework in this fi eld 
is that there are few, if any, mechanisms available other than human rights to 
function as a  “ global normative foundation ” in biomedicine ( Thomasma, 2001, 
300 ) or as a  “ lingua franca of international relations ” ( Knowles, 2001, 253 ). 
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As a well-known expert on public health issues has pointed out,  “ the hu-
man rights framework provides a more useful approach for analyzing and 
responding to modern public health challenges than any framework thus 
far available within the biomedical tradition ” ( Mann, 1996, 924 ). Similarly, it 
has been argued that the recourse to human rights is fully justifi ed on the 
ground that bioethics suffers from the plurality and range of actors involved 
and the overproduction of divergent norms, whereas human rights offers  “ a 
strong framework and a common language, which may constitute a starting 
point for the development of universal bioethical principles ” ( Boussard, 
2007, 114 ). 
 VIII .  SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE USE OF A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH 
 The use of a human rights framework to set up global norms on bioethics 
must often face the objection that human rights are a Western ideological 
construct of little relevance in non-Western (mainly African and Asian) soci-
eties. A corollary of this view is the argument that attempts to impose human 
rights values on non-Western countries amount to cultural imperialism 
( Schroeder, 2005, 221 – 3 ). This objection is often linked to a moral relativistic 
position according to which moral principles are thought of as socially and 
historically contingent, valid only for those cultures and societies in which 
they originate. Consequently, there is no such thing as universally valid 
moral principles, not even the idea that people have inherent dignity and 
rights. 
 Although the philosophical debate between universalists and relativists is 
far too complex to be adequately covered in this paper, some responses to 
the fi rst of the above-mentioned criticisms are immediately available. First, it 
is true that the notion of human rights has recent origins in the European 
Enlightenment philosophers and in the political revolutions of the end of the 
eighteenth century, notably, the American and French Revolutions. How-
ever, this historical circumstance does not necessarily invalidate the widely 
accepted claim that people should be entitled to basic rights by the mere fact 
of being humans. This is the relevant question, no matter where the idea of 
such inherent rights comes from ( Andorno, 2007, 152 ). Merely pointing to 
moral diversity and the presumed integrity of individual cultures does not, 
by itself, provide a philosophical justifi cation for relativism or a suffi cient 
critique of universalism. 
 As a matter of fact, international human rights law has been elaborated by 
representatives of the most diverse countries and cultures and is not intended 
to impose one  cultural standard, but rather to promote a  legal standard of 
minimum protection necessary for human dignity. As such, universal human 
rights can be reasonably seen as the  “ hard-won consensus of the interna-
tional community ” and not as the cultural imperialism of any particular 
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region or set of traditions ( Ayton-Shenker, 1995, 2 ). Even though the modern 
conceptualization of human rights is an historical product of Western civiliza-
tion, the idea, which is at the heart of this notion (that every human being 
deserves to be respected), is present though in different conceptual terms, in 
every human society. 
 In addition to the criticism of  “ cultural imperialism, ” it is also argued that 
human rights are conceived as excessively individualist for non-Western 
mentalities and lack a signifi cant concern for personal duties and for the 
common interest of society. It is true that human rights have been originally 
conceived having in mind the  individual person as the principal bearer of 
such rights. However, it would be equally fair to say that international law 
has made substantial efforts over the last decades to be more attuned to the 
communal and collective basis of many non-Western societies. This was 
done, in particular, through the development of the  “ second generation of 
rights ” that are included in the above-mentioned ICCPR 1966, such as the 
right to education, the right to social security, the right to a fair remunera-
tion, the right to healthy working conditions, the right to health care, the 
protection of the family and children, the right to adequate housing, etc. This 
trend toward a broader understanding of human rights has been even further 
developed with the  “ third generation of human rights, ” the so-called  “ rights 
of solidarity ” or  “ rights of groups, ” which include the right to development, 
to peace, to self-determination, and to a healthy environment. In sum, al-
though human rights remain philosophically grounded within an individual-
ist moral doctrine, there can be no doubt that serious attempts are being 
made by the international community to adequately apply them to more 
communally oriented societies. 
 In any case, the truth is that today these  theoretical controversies have lost 
much of their  practical signifi cance. The fi rst reason for this is that, at present, 
virtually all states accept the authority of international human rights law. The 
six core international human rights treaties (on civil and political rights, 
economic, social, and cultural rights, racial discrimination, women, torture, 
and children) have an average 166 ratifying states, which represents a truly 
impressive 85% ratifi cation rate ( Volodin, 2007 , 15 – 23). The second reason is 
that human rights emerge from international law instruments with suffi cient 
fl exibility to be compatible with respect for cultural diversity. The universality 
of human rights norms is not incompatible with some local variations in the 
 form in which particular rights are implemented ( Donnelly, 1989, 109 – 42 ). 
 IX .  CONCLUSION 
 One of the most impressive features of the emerging international instru-
ments relating to bioethics is that they assign a very central role to the prin-
ciple of respect for human dignity. The UNESCO Universal Declaration on 
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Bioethics and Human Rights is a good example of this trend. Although the 
Declaration does not provide a defi nition of human dignity, this notion is 
usually understood as referring, fi rst, to the intrinsic worth of human beings 
and second, in a derivative way, to the value of humanity as such. But the 
emerging international biolaw also appeals to human rights to set up global 
norms in this fi eld. Several reasons justify this strategy: the obvious link be-
tween health issues and basic human rights; the universalistic claim of hu-
man rights, which facilitates the formulation of transcultural standards; the 
fact that the key notions employed at the domestic level to protect people 
from misuse in the biomedical fi eld are already formulated using the termi-
nology of rights; and the lack of any conceptual and institutional instrument 
other than human rights to produce an international framework of norms 
relating to biomedicine. 
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